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heroic and most human fortitude, is so beautiful and so beautifully told, that it seems almost a profanation to comment on it. But all readers will feel that, grateful as they are for the whole book, they are most grateful for that.

LONDON.

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF CONDUCT. By Thomas Marshall, M. A.
London: Unwin, 1906. Pp. xxi, 578.

This book deserves recognition as a considerable effort to present the substance of Aristotle's "Ethics" to the general reader, on the part of a writer who is not in sympathy with idealistic philosophy. The author, I should judge, though genuinely interested in Aristotle, not merely in the "Ethics," but also in the "Metaphysics" and "De Anima," can hardly be regarded as a highly trained scholar; and the general result is that his views, vigorously and persistently maintained, convey a one-sided but not valueless impression of Aristotle's thought, although in detail his interpretations and arguments are far from trustworthy.

The book is divided into chapters with such titles as, "The Genesis and Nature of Moral Conduct" ("Ethics," I, xiii, Book II), or "Feelings in Relation to Conduct—Pleasure and Pain" ("Ethics," VII, xi-xiv, and X, i-iv). Each chapter consists of a short introduction, followed by a full analysis of the text, with footnotes citing largely from the Greek, and a conclusion dealing with the subject by way of summary and criticism. There is also a general introduction in which "the purport of the Ethics is summarily set forth." The author rightly claims the liberty of using illustrations from common things to enliven his account of Aristotle's doctrine. But I think that his freedom of paraphrase and example, within his inverted commas, is too large to be justified. Thus he uses the words "in one sense all existence is subjective" in rendering "De Anima" (431, b. 29). It is true that he cites the Greek text in the footnote.

Mr. Marshall's general conception of Aristotle's moral theory starts from the opposition between Aristotle and Plato, which, as he thinks, has been unduly minimized by Kantian interpreters, biased by their sympathy with Plato's doctrine of the Good. In this, and in many similar expressions, he seems to be referring to Professor Stewart's edition of the "Ethics," which has perhaps some tendency to read too much into Aristotle.

For Mr. Marshall, the opposition in question coincides with the distinction between a "relative" and an "absolute" moral standard, which again he takes to be one with the contrast between a standard which varies with circumstances, and an "absolute form" which excludes all relativity and adaptation.

"Prudence takes its color from the social medium in which it is generated and developed. This was a view widely held, and Aristotle thought that it had reason on its side. 'In the sphere of morals, in matters of justice, tolerance and the contrary,' says Socrates in the *Theætetus*," 'there are those who boldly maintain that there is no natural or essential basis but that what is generally believed is true when and so long as it believed.' Such a belief undoubtedly prevailed and still prevails; and Aristotle held it, although Socrates and Plato did not." (P. 566.)

He is aware that relativity may be understood in a sense which destroys the idea of truth, but it seems pretty clear that the variable standards, which he himself affirms, must fall under this condemnation, as implying the prejudice that identity, or a universal, excludes difference.

His positive account of Aristotle's ideas is therefore at its best where the latter's dualism may most fairly be insisted on, as in the account of the intellectual excellences, and of the primary antithesis between the practical and the theoretic life. On these points he conveys an impression which might be described as a caricature of that produced by Dr. Caird's treatment of the question in his *"Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers."* The tendency of interpretation has of late been the other way. It is therefore not a bad thing that the charge of dualism should be enforced against Aristotle's moral theory, not merely by Dr. Caird's masterly analysis, but by Mr. Marshall's rougher attempt to assimilate the basis of the *"Ethics"* to modern relativism and empiricism.

For the same reason, there is some value in the treatment of *"Proairesis."* He rightly raises the question whether we can get out of Aristotle's "preference" anything like an account of the experience of self-determination, which, in one shape or another, a modern implies when he speaks of volition.

There are good remarks, also, about the contrast between the ancient and modern idea of statesmanship; the point being driven home by a rather cynical appreciation of the modern statesman.

I should say, then, that for a student of Greek philosophy with

idealistic leanings, Mr. Marshall's work may be useful reading, "because, look you, you do not love it, nor your affections and your appetites and your disgestions do not agree with it."

But there is something more which I feel bound to point out, though it may apply nearer home, as well as to Mr. Marshall's work. I may state it as follows. The general reader, in subjects of this kind, is wholly at the mercy of his guide. It is not merely a question of mistakes; there is a more important matter than error of detail. Even a correct account of the mere framework and outline of a difficult subject is of very little service to the non-expert reader. It is he, he in particular, who needs the most thorough and suggestive interpretation of the indications which tell how a writer's thought was for himself a living system, and so corresponds with, although it may not resemble, the living thought of to-day. This can only be given by the greatest care and the fullest sympathy; and these are just what writers for the general reader are apt to think superfluous. Why, for instance, could no ordinary translation bring home Euripides to the general reader as Professor Gilbert Murray has brought him? Because what the general reader most particularly needs is just what the ordinary translator cannot give. The obvious outline misleads him, even if it is correct; while if it is incorrect, of course he has not a chance. He needs much more help than the scholar as he is at a greater distance from the object.

For these reasons, I cannot say that I hold Mr. Marshall's book to be serviceable for the public for whom I understand it to be designed. Though right in some of his outlines, yet just where things become interesting, as it seems to me, the author becomes dogmatic and cavalier in his treatment, thinking it not worth while to be precise. Take, for example, the comment on Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Form of the Good. We are told that the Form of the Good is put as an hypothesis only, and one as to the truth of which the author was doubtful, and that it rests on no evidence except Plato's imagination; and the passage concludes:

"Practical reasons are, however, beside the mark; weapons taken from the armory of sense and experience are powerless against an object so impalpable as the Platonic idea; it is as if you were to attack a cloud with a broadsword. If Plato had desired to answer Aristotle, he would probably have done so in the sense in which Hegel replied to Kant's objection to the doc-

trine of the Absolute. 'Do you mean,' said Kant, 'that there is absolutely no difference between having ten dollars and not having them?' 'Philosophy,' answered Hegel, 'has nothing to do with dollars.' "

Now here, the important point to my mind is that the author has just reinforced the attitude to which the non-expert reader is inclined; and therefore he has in no way helped him to get nearer the object. If one was going to allude to Kant's criticism of the ontological argument—perhaps an unwise thing to do in a brief statement—one was surely bound to point out its real relation to such a doctrine as Plato's.

So with the discussion of the quantitative nature of the distinction between goodness and badness, carrying with it the question of recognizing something like the pure will and the unity of the moral virtues.

Here again the author brings in his antagonism to the "absolute form" of moral qualities, holding that if we deny the difference of virtue and vice to be in Aristotle's view quantitative, we are tied down to the "absolute form," and debarred from admitting degrees of goodness. It does not occur to him that a positive act, expressive of a mood or spirit, must always involve a system of quantitative adjustments instrumental to such expressions, and that Aristotle emphasizes the correspondence of "inner" and "outer" in the moral act by requiring the predominance of the true motive or principle, as alone having power to bring every detail of the action into the right proportion. (Aristotle's account of "magnificence" is an instructive example. "The churl in spirit, howe'er he veil"—this and the next two stanzas of "In Memoriam," surely give the sort of meaning required.)

Therefore, naturally, he sees no point in the unity of the virtues, as implied in practical wisdom, and ventures on an exceptional piece of construing (1145 a1) in order to deny that Aristotle maintains it.

And many important and interesting questions he cuts short as futile or omits to notice. I mention a few at random: Whether value can be contrasted as absolute and relative (*τιμὸν* and *ἐπαινετόν*); the idea of natural right; whether a man has rights that his own consent cannot alienate; the objective unity of minds in friendship (where the priority of Egoism is what interests the author); the theory of leisure in relation to the attainment of the end.

Finally, in treating of Regulative Justice, he severely criticizes

Aristotle's view of punishment and damages according to the ordinary interpretation, and explains *de haut en bas* that "the true theory of punishment" is the deterrent theory, as Plato puts it in Protagoras' mouth. He does not seem to be aware that there is another interpretation of Aristotle's language, the discussion of which would have better occupied his space than the gratuitous piece of dogmatism I have mentioned. The author's detailed interpretation, then, seems to me of little value, and unreliable for the novice. But there does seem to be something of a divergence or reaction in the criticism of the "Ethics" at the present moment, and as a symptom of this, and a crude contribution to the statement of it, the work has its value.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

ST. ANDREWS.

THE LIFE OF REASON, or, the Phases of Human Progress. By George Santayana. In Five Volumes. London: Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd., 1905.

This book is so wanting in clearness of thought that I doubt whether it can be of much use to anyone. Mr. Santayana usually expresses his views in words which convey at the same time several different propositions, some of which may be true while others are false. And if we read on, in the hope that these different propositions may be distinguished, we generally find that, instead of distinguishing what was originally confused, Mr. Santayana adds to the confusion by introducing other entirely new propositions which have no closer connection with the original ones than these had with one another. Such confused thinking may, no doubt, be very "suggestive"; and this Mr. Santayana very frequently is. But in order that mere suggestions may be of any use, it is surely necessary that someone should think out exactly what important truth it is that is suggested, and should distinguished this truth clearly from the other truths or errors with which it is mingled; and it may be doubted whether Mr. Santayana's book will lead to the performance of this difficult process. Again, mere confused suggestions may, no doubt, have a great æsthetic value; for confusion of thought does not seem to be inconsistent with very high literary merit. And this book certainly possesses much more literary merit than most philosophical writing. But I doubt whether it possesses enough to